The Discrepancy between Deceptive Belief and Practice Online by Hall, Cameron
Revealing Online Deception: 
The discrepancy between deceptive belief and practice online 
 
Honors Thesis 
Presented to the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Social Sciences 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Research Honors Program 
 
by 
Cameron Wilton Hall 
May 2008 
Jeffrey Hancock   Revealing Online Deception 2 
 
Abstract 
Do we really encounter as many lies as we think online? The present study examines the 
possibility of a prevalence paradox, or the discrepancy between one’s beliefs about 
deception online and actual encounters with deception. This research tests several factors 
that may influence the prevalence paradox in mediated communication, including 
characteristics of the user (e.g., experience) and of the communication environment (e.g., 
synchronicity and evanescence). Participants reported on their beliefs and experiences 
with deception in email, instant-messaging, blogs, and social networks. Although the 
results from this study did not support the predicted factors for the prevalence paradox, 
they did confirm the existence of the paradox in each of the communication 
environments.   Revealing Online Deception 3 
 
Revealing Online Deception: 
The discrepancy between deceptive belief and practice online 
People tend to hold strong beliefs about deception, from what kinds of cues may 
reveal deception to what actually counts as a lie. For the purposes of this discussion, we 
will define deception as either a successful or an unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without 
forewarning, to create in another a belief, which the communicator considers untrue 
(Vrij, 2000). One belief or assumption held by many deception researchers is that 
deception occurs with great frequency in our everyday communication (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). It is difficult, however, for people to believe that 
their daily interactions contain deception. When communicating, we are trying to make 
sense of a message based on the assumption that the message is true. Without this 
assumption, fostering any type of relationship or meaningful conversation would be 
difficult. It follows naturally then that people in a functioning society believe that lying 
takes place less than it actually does. The truth bias explains the tendency to assume that 
a communicator’s message is truthful (Vrij, 2000).  
While the truth bias explains a predisposition to trust our communication partners, 
it does not explain why we continue to maintain a certain level of trust. In other words, if 
we are lied to so much, why do we continue to be so trusting? The main explanation is 
that people typically do not know when they are the object of deceit. We are poor lie 
detectors in large part because we rely heavily on non-verbal cues to detect deception. 
People believe cues, such as diverted eye gaze and fidgeting, can reveal deception. This 
is in part because these cues differ from normal interactions. Prior research defines 
perceived nonverbal deviations from normative expectations as expectancy-violations Revealing Online Deception 4 
 
(Bond, Omar, Pitre, Lashley, Skaggs, & Kirk, 1992). Vrij (2000) argues that not only do 
deceivers, in general, tend to focus more on the content of their deception, thus ignoring 
their nonverbal behaviors; they are simply not skilled at suppressing these cues. Despite 
these findings, research shows that nonverbal cues are unreliable indicators when it 
comes to catching a liar (Vrij, 2000). Thus, the reliance on these cues is misleading and 
inaccurate. 
  The Internet has opened a new world of communication and has changed the way 
we look at deception. In most computer-mediated communication (CMC), we cannot see 
our communication partners and nonverbal cues are eliminated. George, Marett, and 
Tilley (2006) argue that in CMC the medium acts as a filter, even for leaked cues, 
blocking the receiver from perceiving them. Without the nonverbal cues that people 
believe facilitate deception detection, CMC users feel somewhat handicapped when it 
comes to detecting deception online. This may result in a certain level of mistrust, and for 
this reason, it may be reasonable for people to believe that lies are more prevalent in 
CMC than face-to-face (FtF). We believe that people follow an ease of lying heuristic 
where people believe that the easier it is to tell a lie the more likely a person will lie. As 
stated before, because CMC does not permit the leakage of nonverbal cues, it appears that 
lying would be easier in CMC than FtF. It follows then that in a CMC environment, 
without the presence of nonverbal cues, people may be more likely to expect deception 
because we assume it is easier to accomplish. 
  Despite any distrust of the Internet, lying online is not as prevalent as people 
might believe. In one study of deception, Hancock, Thom-Santelli, and Ritchie (2004) 
explored the frequency of deception across various communication technologies. Their Revealing Online Deception 5 
 
results showed that lying on the Internet is not particularly new or exciting. In fact, 
Hancock et al. (2004) found that the overwhelming majority of lies occurred in a basic 
FtF setting. In addition, telephone conversation had the highest rate of lying, followed by 
FtF, instant-messaging (IM), and least of all email.  
Despite these empirical findings, Caspi and Gorsky (2006) found that 73% of all 
participants believed deception is widespread online, while only 29% reported that they 
themselves lie online. Furthermore, participants reported that there were few, if any, 
attempts were to deceive them online. This evidenced a clear discrepancy between 
people’s beliefs and actual practice of deception online.   
As Caspi and Gorsky (2006) established, people believe the internet is rife with 
deception. However, evidence from Hancock et al. (2004) suggests that lies may not even 
occur with the greatest frequency online. Furthermore, according to Caspi and Gorsky 
(2006), despite the fact that people believe lying is widespread online, they do not report 
lying themselves with a proportionate frequency. As a result, there is a significant 
difference between how much people believe lying occurs online and how much they 
personally experience it. The prevalence paradox defines this particular phenomenon, 
which suggests that people are distrustful of the online environment despite the world’s 
increasing dependence on the medium both professionally and socially. 
As stated, we believe that the primary reason for such a belief rests in the fact that 
the environment is stripped of non-verbal cues, which people believe they can depend on 
for detecting deceit. This makes intuitive sense, because in the absence of these cues 
people believe lying is easier and should therefore occur with greater frequency (i.e., the 
ease of lying heuristic). Importantly however, research to date has focused only on Revealing Online Deception 6 
 
frequency and not on the magnitude of lies online or the different possible 
communication environments available online (e.g., chat vs. email, blogs). For instance, 
although Caspi and Gorsky (2006) concluded that people believe the online environment 
is inherently deceitful, they base their conclusion on findings drawn from a study focused 
only on newsgroup participants. As a result, they fail to make a distinction between 
various types of environments. However, communication environments have varying 
features that distinguish them from one another. Accordingly, this study will focus 
specifically on the beliefs people hold about deception on differentiated CMC 
environments — namely email, instant-messenger (IM), blogs, and social networks. This 
deeper focus will allow us to not only demonstrate the presence of the prevalence 
paradox, but also offer further insight as to why it exists. 
As mentioned, we believe the lack of non-verbal cues online is the primary factor 
in producing an inherent distrust of the online world. However, the different CMC 
environments, for the most part, uniformly strip non-verbal cues. Therefore, the lack of 
non-verbal cues cannot be a driving factor in predicting or determining where people 
believe deception will occur with the greatest frequency. What becomes important then is 
determining the factors associated with a lack of non-verbal cues that breed distrust 
online, and cross apply those factors to differentiated CMC environments.   
Given the ease of lying heuristic, if we determine what people believe makes 
deception easier online, we can infer which communication environments they believe 
will be the most deceitful based on characteristics of those environments and 
characteristics of the sender and receiver. Carlson and Zmud (1994) took a similar 
approach when expanding on the media richness theory. They found that personal factors Revealing Online Deception 7 
 
could expand the potential bandwidth provided by a communication environment. We 
believe there are three factors that significantly influence the perceived ease of deception 
online; experience with the communication environment, synchronicity of the 
communication environment, and perceived social distance. 
Experience with a communication environment may play the greatest role in 
predicting where people believe that most lying will occur online. As experience 
increases within a certain communication environment, people develop a set of normative 
expectations for how a conversation or exchange will progress. As one repeatedly 
confirms these expectations through experiences, a person’s confidence in detecting 
deception increases. They expect to be able to recognize any deviation from their 
expectation and in turn expect to be able to catch most liars. As a result, they do not 
expect lying to occur with any great regularity in the communication environment in 
which they have significant experience. Furthermore, as experience increases, they may 
automatically filter out deceptive behavior without even knowing it. For example, 
someone who uses email all the time may automatically disregard spam mail without 
even considering it deceptive. The effect due to experience is hard to predict because 
experience with various communication environments change from person to person. 
However, it may be explainable in part by the communication environment. Email was 
the first wide spread communicative communication environment, followed by IM, 
blogs, and finally social networks. Applying this historical progression might predict that 
people have the most experience with email and the least experience with social 
networks. Revealing Online Deception 8 
 
Each communication environment has a defined level of synchronicity. The user 
may control exactly how synchronous a specific exchange may be, but the 
communication environment allows for a particular range of synchronicity. Accordingly, 
IM is the most synchronous, followed by email, blogs, and social networks. IM and email 
both encourage a response from a specific person, but conversations in IM essentially 
take place in real time, as long pauses between exchanges are typically inappropriate. 
Email, on the other hand is more of a message awaiting reply at the convenience of the 
receiver. As such, the sender may expect a considerable wait before a response, 
depending on the nature of the message. Exchanges on blogs and social networks are 
often not directed at any particular person and there is no expected time frame for a 
response. Therefore, we are required to evaluate synchronicity based on social norms and 
perceived synchronicity. We expect that people will report IM as the most synchronous, 
while blogs and social networks are the least synchronous. This builds the basic premise 
is that IM grant the least opportunity for planning or tailoring deception, while blogs and 
social networks allow for much more.   
Perceived social distance is also largely a function of the specific communication 
environment. The further removed a CMC environment makes two people feel from each 
other, the more they will believe deception occurs. Essentially, the more disconnected 
people feel relative to social distance the less confident they will feel in judging character 
and detecting deception. The effect follows the idea that as cues people rely on to detect 
deception are stripped away, people feel more vulnerable to lies and expect more 
deception. As people feel further and further removed from the source of a message, they 
feel more stripped of cues and their expectation for deception increases.   Revealing Online Deception 9 
 
Previous research not only failed to differentiate between CMC environments 
(e.g., Caspi & Gorsky, 2006), but also between differing types of deception. It is 
important to know not only whether or not deception is happening, but also the nature of 
the deception. People will often refer to a deceptive statement as “just a little white lie.” 
This type of deception is usually innocuous and would be something like attributing your 
tardiness to traffic, when you really just woke up late. Deception increases in magnitude 
from there. The consequences of a lie increase with the magnitude of the lie. If your 
mother cannot find her necklace and you lie and say, you have not seen it when you 
actually broke it; you have left the realm of white lies. This time, the consequences are 
more severe. Suppose your father cannot find your mother and ask if you have seen her. 
If you tell him no, when you left her at the grocery store, the consequences could be 
severe. Obviously, these types of lies are very different, but in Caspi and Gorsky’s (2006) 
study, they are treated as equal. The present study will differentiate between lies of 
varying magnitudes to see which CMC environments people believe will facilitate lies of 
the greatest magnitude.   
We believe that the most influential factor in determining where people think the 
lies of greatest magnitude will occur is verifiability of the lie. Essentially, the 
environment wherein people believe it is the hardest to be caught lying will be the 
environment wherein people believe the most serious lies will occur. We believe there are 
characteristics specific to the CMC environments that will affect people’s beliefs about 
potential consequences, such as the evanescence of the message contained in the specific 
communication environment. Unlike face-to-face communication, online communication 
maintains a written record of the message. The length of time the message is stored and Revealing Online Deception 10 
 
the nature in which it is stored vary across different communication environments. 
Communication environments that users believe do not store messages, or do so for a 
short period, and where the messages are not readily accessible, should promote lies of 
greater magnitude. 
In IM, the conversation is conventionally stored only during the current 
interaction. At the closing or termination of an interaction, the records are lost. On the 
contrary, email messages are stored until deletion. However, there is a record for both the 
sender and receiver of an email. For a record to be lost, both parties must delete it. Blogs 
and social networks share similar properties: they both display content until their removal 
by the author or administrator. However, this does not ensure complete removal because 
external sources may download the information and store it without notice. Assuming 
these conventions for message, storage and retrieval we expect to see the lies of greatest 
magnitude in IMs, followed by blogs or social networks, and of the least magnitude in 
email. To disambiguate the difference between evanescence in a blog post and social 
network profile, we will examine people’s beliefs about retrievably for the 
communication environments. 
Other factors may influence where people believe lies of larger magnitude occur. 
Nonetheless, the evanescence of the message should be the strongest predictor for beliefs 
about lies of greater magnitude because this is what people will think of as the most 
important factor in getting caught or not. If a message disappears when the conversation 
ends, one can be confident that if they successfully deceived during an instance, the lie 
will not reappear later. However, if the lie sits in cyber space, accessible to anyone, the 
lie could reappear at anytime. Revealing Online Deception 11 
 
Using the previously presented theories and heuristics, this study proposes four 
hypotheses. First, increased experience with the communication environment leads users 
to believe they can better detect deception. As experience increases, the user feels more 
confident they can rely on cues hidden to a user with less experience. Thus, an 
experienced user will believe it is harder for him or her to be deceived and subsequently 
that lying must occur less. Second, the more synchronous a CMC environment is the less 
people will believe that lying occurs because longer response times provide a better 
opportunity for someone to plan their deception. This makes it easier to deceive, thus 
leaving the user to feel more vulnerable to deception. Third, the perceived social distance 
inherent to communication environment will play a significant role in determining where 
people believe the most deception will occur. The further removed someone feels from 
the person they are communicating with, the more susceptible to deception that person 
feels. As a result, if a CMC environment increases social distance between people, it in 
turn increases the belief that more deception is occurring. Finally, as the evanescence of a 
communication environment increases the magnitude of the lies in the environment will 
decrease. If it is easier to check a deceptive statement, people will assume the deceit less 
significant. Thus, if it is easy to retrieve a pervious conversation, the lies in the 
conversation should be little white lies.  
To test these hypotheses, the present exploratory study conducted a survey of 
college students to examine their beliefs about deception. The subjects reported on their 
use and perceived characteristics in each of the aforementioned communication 
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communication environments provided they claimed to have previously used the 
environment.   
Method 
Participants 
  Since this topic has remained rather untested and we are examining beliefs, 
conducting and exploratory online survey was the best option. The exact population 
would include all internet users that have used email, instant messaging, blogs, and social 
networks, therefore we decided on a convenience sample. Participants were 
undergraduate students from Cornell University. Most, but not all of the subjects, 
received participation credit in an Information Science or Communication course for 
completing the study. Although it is impossible to calculate a traditional response rate 
due to the recruitment method described below, we did have a 97% completion rate 
among those who registered for the study. There were 206 subjects: 76 males, 130 
females, with an average age of 20. Additionally, the subjects were classified into one of 
15 majors of study covering most of the colleges at the university. The most common 
major was communication at 17% followed by biology at 15% and engineering at 10%. 
The least common major was animal science with 1%. All subjects completed the survey, 
but some questions were omitted if the subject lacked experience in a communication 
environment. All students reported experience with email and instant messaging, but only 
158 and 171 reported having experience with blogs and social networks respectively. 
This sample is certainly a subset of the population being educated, college internet users, 
however generalization issues are noted in the discussion. 
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  We created an online survey to record the subject’s beliefs and experience with 
deception online. We opted against a survey service and built the survey in-house to 
ensure security, flexibility, and credibility. The survey consisted of 47 questions, but 
could be fewer if the subject lacked experience in a communication environment as 
previously noted. In addition to their beliefs and experience, subjects reported their 
gender, age, and major. All other questions were on recorded using a 7-point Likert-scale. 
First, both the scale and the questions were evaluated by a pilot study. In the pilot study, 
subjects were given open-ended questions to explain their beliefs and usage patterns. 
Additionally, we were able to reword our questions based on feedback and response 
patterns. The resulting close-ended questions helped ensure accurate results, while 
minimizing time required to complete the survey. Subjects could complete the survey 
over standard or secure http access. The survey data was stored in a MySQL database and 
the participation records were store in a protected text file. Hash codes protected the 
subject’s identity in the database. 
Procedure 
  Students were recruited by asking them to complete a brief survey concerning 
online deception. Unlike the Caspi and Gorsky (2006) study which used the channel 
under examination to recruit subjects, we used a selected audience. Specifically, we 
utilized class announcements to recruit participants in addition to posting a participation 
flyer near other experiments. At that time, the students received the survey’s web address. 
After visiting the site and reading the informed consent, the subject entered their full 
name and NetID (email address) to register for the survey. An automatic email sent to the 
subject then provided a unique link to the survey. Upon following their link, the subject Revealing Online Deception 14 
 
was asked again for their NetID to confirm their identity. Once their identity was 
confirmed they began the survey. 
  The survey was broken into two bundles of questions. The first bundle of 
questions addressed perceived characteristics of the communication environment and the 
second examined beliefs and experiences. Each bundle contained four sets of questions, 
one for each communication environment. The first communication environment 
examined was email, followed by instant messaging, blogs, then social networks. Both 
bundles followed the same sequence and was identical for all participants. 
  The subject first completed items concerned with each communication 
environment’s general characteristics, referred to as the General Characteristics Bundle 
of questions. These questions included: the subject’s experience level, who they 
communicate with, reasons for their communication, the level of synchronicity, and 
evanescence. If the subject reported having never used the communication environment, 
they were only asked questions about their beliefs about a communication environment 
(i.e., synchronicity and evanescence). Appendix A illustrates the structure of the General 
Characteristics Bundle. This bundle represents the independent variables in the study. 
After completing the General Characteristics Bundle, subjects were given the 
Beliefs and Experience Bundle. If the subject reported having experience in a 
communication environment, they were asked about both their beliefs and then 
experience with the communication environment. If the subject previously reported 
having never used the communication environment, they were only asked for their beliefs 
about the communication environment. The first two questions were general or belief 
questions. They asked how often people lie in the communication environment and to Revealing Online Deception 15 
 
what extent the lies are little white lies. Four experience questions then followed which 
examined the frequency and magnitude of lies. In the experience set, the first two asked 
when they were the subject of deception and the last two were for when the subject was 
the deceiver. Appendix B demonstrates the structure of the Beliefs and Experience 
Bundle and the dependent variables under examination. 
Although these constructs have taken the form of individual questions, they are 
addressed for each of the environments. In other words, we are not simply asking if a 
participant is lied to in an individual environment, but instead examining if they are lied 
to in each of the environments.  
If a question was skipped at any point during the survey, the subject was sent back 
to the page and required to answer the missing question. However, a subject could not 
change their answers once it was submitted. The subject was required to complete the 
entire survey during a single session, which took approximately 10 minutes. 
  Once the survey is completed, the subject was asked to select the class for which 
they would like to receive credit. If the subject did not take the survey for credit, they 
could simply close their browser. 
  Due to the exploratory nature of this study, we were unable to test the external 
validity measures. However, the dataset was proven reliable by confirming the predefined 
characteristics of each CMC environment. For instance, the subjects accurately reported 
the synchronicity order of the environments as described in the introduction. This finding 
was repeated in two scenarios which are further discussed in the results. 
Once the survey ended, we examined the data for incomplete entries and other 
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for SPSS. SPSS is a statistical data software package that provides the means for an array 
of test. We ran multiple analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Spearman tests to examine 
our hypotheses in addition to other interesting patterns.  
Results 
The first hypothesis predicted that those with higher experience would perceive 
less deception online. The only statistically significant finding was for social networks, 
which revealed a positive correlation of r = 0.23 (see Table 1), suggesting that those who 
reported having more experience with social networks believed there is more deception in 
social networks. This pattern is the opposite of the hypothesis. Therefore, we are unable 
to support the first hypothesis that higher levels of experience will lessen perceived 
deception. 
The second hypothesis predicted that synchronous communication environments 
have lower perceived deception. Two communication environments returned statistically 
significant results, but only one supported the hypothesis. Email had a negative 
correlation of r = -0.16 (see Table 2), suggesting that those who believe email is 
asynchronous also believe deception is more prevalent. While email supports the 
hypothesis, there was a positive correlation of r = 0.17 between synchronous blogging 
and perceived deception (see Table 2). Subjects reporting that blogging is asynchronous 
did not believe there is a lot of deception in blogs. Therefore, we are unable to support 
the second hypothesis that the more synchronous a communication environment the 
lower perceived deception. Although the hypothesis was not supported using subjects 
perception of synchronicity, the data did confirm our assumptions about synchronicity 
among the communication environments (see Table 3). Using a paired T test confirmed Revealing Online Deception 17 
 
that IM was the most synchronous followed by email, social networks, and then blogs at 
the 0.01 significance level. In other words, the subjects accurately portrayed the 
synchronicity levels in each of the communication environment, which supports the 
reliability of the sample. 
The third hypothesis predicted higher social distance with increased perceived 
deception. Only one communication environment returned statistically significant 
findings, but the correlation contrasts with the hypothesis. There was a positive 
correlation (r = 0.18) in social networks for communicating with people known 
personally and perceived levels of deception (see Table 4). In other words, people 
communicate with people that they know personally in social networks and believe their 
communication or profiles contain lies. Therefore, we are unable to support the third 
hypothesis that higher social distance will lead to increased perceived deception. 
 The final hypothesis predicted that lies of lower magnitude would be observed in 
communication environments with higher recordability. There were no statistically 
significant findings either for or against the hypothesis (see Table 5). Therefore, we are 
unable to support the fourth hypothesis that recordability influences the magnitude of 
lies. However, similar to the second hypothesis the predictions about the communication 
environment were accurate and statistically significant (see Table 6). Email has the 
greatest recordability followed by social networks, blogs, and then IM when using a 
paired T test at the 0.01 significance level. Once again, the subjects accurately portrayed 
the synchronicity levels in each of the communication environments, which supports the 
reliability of the sample. 
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After failing to support the above hypotheses, we tested the assumption that the 
prevalence paradox exists in the dataset. We performed a paired T test to examine the 
prevalence paradox in each of the communication environments. To compute the 
prevalence paradox we subtracted each subjects reported encounter or lied to frequency 
from their general belief frequency. If the result is a positive value, the subject believes 
there is more deception in the communication environment than they reportedly 
encounter. Therefore, a positive value illustrates the existence of the prevalence paradox. 
As seen in Table 7, the existence prevalence paradox was positive and statistically 
significant for all of the communication environments, suggesting that the paradox does 
exist in each of the four environments. 
In addition to checking for the existence of the paradox, we also analyzed the 
regression coefficients holding the general frequency of lies as the dependent variable. 
For each of the environments, the “lied to” value had the greatest b value except in email 
where it is second to lying (see Table 8). Although this is not a causal relationship, it does 
suggest that one’s encounters with deception influence their general belief about 
deception. In other words, one’s encounters or lied to frequency has the greatest influence 
on their general beliefs about deception, but frequently encountering lies does not cause 
one to believe deception is more prevalent in the communication environment. 
Discussion 
  This study examined the existence of the prevalence paradox in email, IM, blogs, 
and social networks. The results demonstrated that the prevalence paradox exists in each 
of the communication environments. Additionally, we identified three predicting factors 
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unable to support the hypotheses. Below we discuss each of the factors and possible 
reasons for why the predictors failed in addition to their implications for understanding 
the prevalence paradox. 
The prevalence paradox 
  The support for the prevalence paradox across the different communications 
environments was statistically supported. The paradox demonstrates that we encounter a 
disproportionate amount of deception online from what we believe to generally exist in 
the communication environment. In other words, we encounter a lower frequency of 
deception in email, IM, blogs, and social networks than what we believe exist in each of 
the environments overall. While original support for this finding was limited to 
newsgroups (Caspi & Gorsky, 2006), demonstrating its existence in other communication 
environments provides ground for further research of the phenomena. Although this study 
covers the major online communication environments, other CMC environments remain 
untested. 
  The study was also interested in what types of factors lead to the prevalence 
paradox, including the experience of the user and characteristics of the communication 
environment. Below each factor is discussed.  
User Experience 
The first hypothesis predicted that more experience with a medium would lead to 
less perceptions of deception in that medium. In general, the data did not support this 
hypothesis. There was, however, a significant correlation between experience and 
perceived deception in social networks. This positive correlation suggests that those with 
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expect that social networks had the strongest correlation because it is the youngest 
communication environment. Similar to Wather’s (1996) hyperpersonal model, we over 
attribute the general characteristics of online communication environments. If we 
encounter a few lies in our first experience, we will believe the environment is plagued 
with deception. Since we do not encounter lies frequently, one would expect that users 
with experience believe there is less deception than those without experience. However, 
when comparing the general belief of deception frequency for subjects with no social 
network experience and those with experience we found a difference of 0.57 (see Table 
9). This means that there is no statistically significant difference between those with and 
without experience on social networks regarding their general beliefs about the frequency 
of deception. 
We also found that there was a strong correlation between communicating with 
someone known personally and being the target of deceit on online social networks (see 
Table 4). This positive relationship claims that the more someone interacts with their 
friends on social networks, the more they feel like the target of deception. Since one 
presumably interacts more frequently with friends, they have more opportunities to 
identify deception. In addition to having more opportunities, friends know more about 
one another and are more likely to identify a lie that is not identified by a stranger. This 
relates to the concept of the truth-bias and trusting strangers. As described by O’Sullivan 
(2000), we strategically present ourselves to others in different communication 
environments. This includes being able to afford little white lies on online social 
networks because it more difficult to check facts. Since we have a truth-bias towards 
strangers and are unable to check potential lies in online social networks, the correlation Revealing Online Deception 21 
 
between communicating with people known personally and being lied to should be 
positively correlated. Additionally, this aligns with the regression analysis suggesting that 
being the target of deceit influences our overall perception in a communication 
environment. Although being lied to does not cause us to perceive more general 
deception, it has an influence. 
Finally, the questions concerning experience required a range of experience levels 
for accurate predictions concerning its influence on the beliefs about deception. The 
mean experience levels were 6.61, 6.39, 4.11, and 5.74 for email, IM, blogs, and social 
networks respectively. In other words, the subjects reported having lots of experience in 
all the channels except blogs. The third-person effect explains that subjects believe they 
are at less risk of persuasion than others (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000). Further 
exaggerations take place when examining college students and self-reporting higher 
experience levels demonstrates the subjects’ higher assumed intelligence. Since users 
self-reported their experience level, it is difficult to determine a user’s actual experience 
level when compared to others. Along the same lines, the subject pool is required to use 
email frequently, which may artificially inflate their scores when compared to the general 
population. Lastly, the wording of the question might also influence the inflated 
experience levels. The question asked them to rate their experience level, not their level 
of expertise. While not all of us are experts, many of us use the communication 
environment frequently and thus have a high level of experience. 
Beliefs about medium characteristics 
  Through the analysis of the second hypothesis, we find that people believe that 
there is little deception in blogging, even though it is asynchronous. This is the opposite Revealing Online Deception 22 
 
of both the hypothesis and the case with email. This positive relationship means that 
people do not believe being able to edit a blog post correlates with deception. In fact, they 
believe that since blogs are not synchronous, they contain less deception. To explain such 
a finding, one must examine the relationship between the blogger and the reader. The 
average rating of people that use blogs to communicate with people they know personally 
was 2.46. This means that people are using blogs to communicate with strangers. We can 
therefore claim that people are more likely to trust blog posts from those that they do not 
know personally. When communicating with strangers we often employ the truth-bias, 
but also retain fragile trust (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson, & Wright, 2002). If a blog reader 
encounters deception, they are likely to remember the deceit and retain distrust in for the 
blog. Since blogs are typically multiple blogs on a singular topic, one is likely to abandon 
a distrustful blog for a new one. Readers understand that accurate reporting and ethics 
provide the foundation for the blogging community. Walther’s (1996) hyperpersonal 
model is again employed as blog readers because our trust is continually confirmed by 
blog posters, which leads to the over attribution of truthfulness. Therefore, in 
communicating with strangers through blogs, we are more likely to trust what we read. 
In general, the social network results were the opposite of what was expected. 
According to the ease of lying heuristic, people should assume fewer lies on social 
networks because there are non-verbal cues in addition to verbal cues. The deviation from 
the heuristic could be due to an increase in the opportunity to lie. Unlike the other 
communication environments, information in social networks does not pertain to a 
singular topic. Since there are more opportunities to deceive, people may believe that 
deception is more prevalent. However, the subjects reported that most of these lies were Revealing Online Deception 23 
 
little white lies. Such lies could range from editing a profile picture to befriending 
someone who is not a friend, which are common practices in social networks. Therefore, 
we likely overlook little white lies because of their insignificance. 
  The lack of statically significant findings suggests additional factors are at play. 
One such possible factor is filtering noise. This means that users might not even 
acknowledge messages considered deceptive by others, but rather perceive them as noise 
in the communication environment. Benway (1998) defines the filtering of consistent 
noise as banner blindness. For example, users ignore potential spam emails, phishing, or 
bots, instead of classifying them as deceptive. Users with more experience will do this 
more naturally, but users with less experience still filter out the noise even though it takes 
more time. It is possible that subjects would report more deception if they were asked to 
visit the communication environments and count the instances of deception. However, in 
doing so, it would be impossible to test for the prevalence paradox, as all the subject 
would be the target of all lies. 
Implications and limitations  
The most obvious limitation is the restrictions in the sample population. While 
limiting the population to undergraduate students at Cornell University limits the 
abstraction of the results, it does provide insight into a sample immersed in the 
technology. This could influence the factors that contribute to the prevalence paradox. 
Although repeating this study on a national level may return different results for the 
aforementioned predictors, it would likely also support the prevalence paradox. 
The support for the prevalence paradox does in fact have implications. Although the 
population was limited, the prevalence paradox does exist in each of the four CMC Revealing Online Deception 24 
 
environments. While this study fails to identify particular contributing factors to the 
prevalence paradox, it does support its application to CMC environments other than 
newsgroups. Future research could explore communication environments that are 
untested by the prevalence paradox. Doing so may reveal a better understanding for the 
characteristics that contribute to the formation of the prevalence paradox. Another 
possibility could force those with less experience in a channel to explore it for a period of 
time and see how their beliefs change. This experimental methodology would provide a 
stronger insight to the prevalence paradox. 
Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of beliefs about deception. It raises 
questions about the classification and recall of deception as it relates to self-reporters. 
This study further supports the discrepancy between perceived and reported encounters 
with deception online, but the cause of the discrepancy is still unknown. 
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Appendix A 
Bundle of questions about user experience and beliefs regarding a communication 
space 
Channel  Question 
email  I have a lot of experience using email. 
  I use email to communicate with people that I know personally. 
  I use email mostly for work. 
 
I believe that email takes place in real time and feedback is 
immediate. 
  I can easily retrieve an old email. 
IM  I have a lot of experience… 
  I use instant messaging to communicate with… 
  I use instant messaging mostly… 
  I believe that instant messaging takes place… 
  I can easily retrieve… 
blog  … 
  … 
  … 
  … 
  … 
  … 
social networks  … 
  … Revealing Online Deception 28 
 
  … 
  … 
  … 
  … 
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Appendix B 
Bundle of questions concerning beliefs about deception in communication 
environments 
Channel  Preface  Question 
email  In general, I believe that…  people lie a lot in email. 
   
the lies people tell in email are 
mostly little white lies. 
  In my experience, I believe that…  people lie to me a lot in email. 
   
people tell me mostly little 
white lies in email. 
    I lie a lot in email. 
   
I tell mostly little white lies in 
email. 
IM  In general, I believe that…  people lie a lot… 
    the lies people tell… 
  In my experience, I believe that…  people lie to me a lot… 
    people tell me mostly… 
    I lie a lot… 
    I tell mostly… 
blog  …  … 
    … 
  …  … 
    … Revealing Online Deception 30 
 
    … 
    … 
    … 
social networks  …  … 
    … 
  …  … 
    … 
    … 
    … 
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Table 1 
Spearman correlations for the first hypothesis examining experience and frequency of 
deception 
  N  people lie a 
lot 
people lie 
to me a lot 
I lie a 
lot 
I have a lot of experience using email  206  -0.083  -0.067  0.02 
I have a lot of experience using instant 
messaging 
206  -0.008  0.05  -0.009 
I have a lot of experience using blogs  158  0.063  0.073  0.052 
I have a lot of experience using online 
social networks 
171  .234(**)  .237(**)  0.123 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 2 
Spearman correlations for the second hypothesis examining synchronicity and frequency 
of deception 
 
N  people lie a 
lot 
people lie 
to me a lot 
I lie a 
lot 
I believe that email takes place in real time 
and feedback is immediate 
206  -.158(*)  -.165(*)  -0.116 
I believe that instant messaging takes place 
in real time and feedback is immediate 
206  0.008  -0.093  -0.052 
I believe that blogging takes place in real 
time and feedback is immediate 
206  .171(*)  0.082  -0.008 
I believe that online social networks take 
place in real time and feedback is 
immediate 
206  -0.025  0.009  -0.008 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 3 
Paired T test examining the assumed synchronicity of the communication environments 
 
Mean  Std. Error 
Mean 
t  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
I believe that email takes place in real time 
and feedback is immediate - I believe that 
instant messaging takes place in real time and 
feedback is immediate 
-2.18  0.12  -18.13  p < .001 
I believe that email takes place in real time 
and feedback is immediate - I believe that 
online social networks take place in real time 
and feedback is immediate 
0.568  0.134  4.227  p < .001 
I believe that blogging takes place in real time 
and feedback is immediate - I believe that 
online social networks take place in real time 
and feedback is immediate 
-0.956  0.11  -8.714  p < .001 
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Table 4 
Spearman correlations for the third hypothesis examining social distance and frequency 
of deception 
 
N  people lie a 
lot 
people lie to 
me a lot 
I lie a 
lot 
I use email to communicate with people 
that I know personally 
206  -0.028  -0.116  -0.012 
I use instant messaging to communicate 
with people that I know personally 
206  0.059  .165(*)  0.065 
I use blogs to correspond with people I 
know personally 
158  0.069  0.04  0.016 
I use online social networks to 
communicate with people that I know 
personally 
171  .176(*)  .210(**)  0.054 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 5 
Spearman correlations for the fourth hypothesis examining evanescence and magnitude 
of deception 
 
N  the lies 
people tell 














I can easily retrieve an old email  206  -0.063  -0.06  -0.054 
I can easily retrieve an old instant message 
conversation 
206  -0.059  -.151(*)  -0.072 
I can easily retrieve an old blog post  158  0.031  0.053  .202(*) 
I can easily retrieve old online social 
network information 
171  0.09  .157(*)  0.078 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
     Revealing Online Deception 36 
 
Table 6 
Paired T test examining the assumed evanescence of the communication environments 
 
Mean  Std. Error 
Mean 
t  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
I can easily retrieve an old email - I can easily 
retrieve old online social network information 
1.99  0.144  13.788  p < .001 
I can easily retrieve an old blog post - I can 
easily retrieve old online social network 
information 
0.602  0.173  3.48  0.001 
I can easily retrieve an old instant message 
conversation - I can easily retrieve an old blog 
post 
-1.549  0.192  -8.049  p < .001 
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Table 7 
Paired T test examining the existence of the prevalence paradox in the dataset 
 
Mean  Std. Error 
Mean 
t  Sig. (2-
tailed) 
people lie a lot in email - people lie to me a lot 
in email 
.981  .097  10.102  p < .001 
people lie a lot in instant messaging - people 
lie to me a lot in instant messaging 
.840  .099  8.485  p < .001 
people lie a lot in blog posts - I encounter 
many lies in blog posts 
.228  .107  2.123  .035 
people lie a lot in online social networks - I 
encounter many lies in online social networks 
.444  .098  4.543  p < .001 
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Table 8 
Simple regression coefficients holding the general frequency of lies as the dependent 
variable 
  beta  t  sig. 
people lie to me a lot in email  .259  3.931  p < .001 
people lie to me a lot in instant messaging  .507  6.864  p < .001 
I encounter many lies in blog posts  .586  8.475  p < .001 
I encounter many lies in online social networks  .659  11.069  p < .001 
Dependent Variable: people lie a lot in *. 
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Table 9 
Paired T test for equality of means with equal variances assumed in perceived frequency 
of lies in blogs and online social networks 






people lie a lot in blog posts  -0.209  0.835  -0.046  0.221 
people lie a lot in online social 
networks 
-1.862  0.064  -0.571  0.307 
 